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Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique
Titus Stahl
According to his own understanding, Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action offers
a new account of the normative foundations of critical theory.1 Habermas’ motivating insight is
that neither a transcendental or metaphysical solution to the problem of normativity, nor a merely
hermeneutic reconstruction of historically given norms, is  sufficient  to  clarify  the  normative
foundations of critical theory. In response to this insight, Habermas develops a novel account of
normativity which locates the normative demands upon which critical theory draws within the
socially instituted practice of communicative understanding.
Although Habermas has claimed otherwise, this new foundation for critical theory constitutes a
novel and innovative form of “immanent critique”. To argue for and to clarify this claim, I offer,
in section 1, a formal account of immanent critique and distinguish between two different ways
of carrying out such a critique.  In  section  2,  I  examine Habermas’ rejection of the  first,
hermeneutic option. Against  this  background,  I  then show, in  section 3,  that  the  Theory of
Communicative Action attempts to formulate an immanent critique of  contemporary societies
according to a second, “practice-based” model. However, because Habermas, as I will argue in
section 4, commits himself  to an implausibly narrow view in regard to one central element of
such a model – in regard to the social ontology of immanent normativity – his normative critique
cannot develop its full potential (section 5).
1. The Concept of Immanent Critique
Whether a particular theoretical project should be described as “immanent critique” depends on
the meaning of  this  term which,  in  spite  of  its  importance,  has rarely  been clearly  defined.
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Hence, before turning to Habermas’ model, I will clarify what I mean by “immanent critique,”
and the theoretical commitments I take such a project to entail.
Critical theories – or at least, those varieties which locate themselves within the Frankfurt School
tradition  – generally derive some of their methodological commitments from Marx's early
writings. Criticizing the Utopian  tendencies of his time, Marx rejects all “dogmatic”  forms of
normative criticism, which postulate normative principles from a context-free, external vantage
point.2 However, criticizing Hegel, Marx also argues that social critique is not to be based on a
reconstruction of “reason in history”, but rather  on an analysis of the material conditions of
social reproduction.3 Thus, insofar  as we can attribute any normative project to Marx, he must
envisage a form of criticism that draws on norms which already exist in objective social reality.4
Many critical theorists have subsequently endorsed this broad strategy of justifying the normative
standards of  critique  by reference to immanent potentials of social reality. In so doing, these
theorists  not  only  reject  forms of moral constructivism and of  moral realism that  introduce
norms from the “outside”, but they also reject a merely “internal” application of those normative
standards which are already accepted by their audience.5
However,  any theory  which attempts to draw on  normative standards within objective social
reality in  this  manner  must solve three distinct problems: First, in  order  to justify a critical
judgment by reference to immanent social standards, a theory must plausibly explain the sense in
which  such immanent standards “exist.”  Providing  such  an  explanation  requires  a social
ontology:  a theoretical account that specifies the meaning of  claims regarding the existence of
particular  social  entities, and in this  case, of  socially  immanent norms.  Second,  even given a
justification for the assumption of immanent norms on the level of a social ontology, it is unclear
what type of epistemic access social critics have to the relevant normative potentials immanent to
social reality.  Third and finally, it is an open question as to  what kind of  critical  authority  an
immanent critique that draws upon them can aspire to. In summary,  any model of immanent
critique must clarify:  the  ontology of the immanent  normative standards employed;  its
epistemology; and the consequences  of its  reliance upon those standards for its  own  critical
capacity.
Although these questions are seldom clearly distinguished, there have been numerous attempts to
address the issues they raise. We can roughly divide these answers into two camps, which I will
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term the “hermeneutic”  and “practice-based” forms of  immanent  critique.  The hermeneutic
camp  designates  those  political theorists whose  social criticism attempts  to  draw on the
interpretive resources available to members of particular  social communities. From the
perspective of a participant in the normative practices of such communities, such theorists argue,
the relevant critical norms can be justified by specific reinterpretations of already accepted social
standards. Such critique is not merely internal because the process of interpretation is thought to
make available new meanings and normative  commitments which have been implicit all along,
but which  have so far not been explicitly acknowledged. Neither is such a critique dogmatic,
because it grants members of the relevant community a certain authority over the issue of  which
interpretation captures the meaning of their norms most authentically. Accounts of this model of
social criticism are  found in the writings of Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor and Alasdair
MacIntyre.6
This hermeneutic strategy is,  however, not the only possible  understanding of an immanent
method of criticism. It can hardly be assumed, for example, that Marx would have been content
with his theory being described as merely a new interpretation of the ideals of bourgeois liberty,
pointing out some hitherto unacknowledged aspects of their meaning. Rather, Marx’s theory is an
example for the  second, “practice-based” type of immanent critique. On this second  view, the
social critic must not only draw on the cultural meanings or the  rules accepted in a given
community, but also on his or her knowledge  about  its objective practices and institutions.
Practice-based immanent criticism thus presupposes that the structures and modes of interaction
in a social community contain  – beyond the explicit understanding of their participants  –
immanent normative potentialities upon which a critic can draw. Clearly, not only Marx but also
contemporary critical theorists like Axel Honneth belong to this second category, and, as I will
argue, so does Jürgen Habermas.7
Although the hermeneutic and practice-based strategies represent two ends of a spectrum on
which many intermediary positions can be found, distinguishing these strategies clarifies different
potential responses to the three problems distinguished above. A hermeneutic-type strategy will
answer the ontological question by postulating implicit potentials of meaning within the accepted
norms and beliefs. It will describe its epistemology as one of hermeneutic interpretation, and it
will answer the question of justification by pointing out the necessary commitment of
participants to the consequences of an authentic interpretation of their beliefs. By contrast,  a
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practice-based strategy will need  to elaborate some kind of  social ontology of norms within
social practices. It will then  have to propose at least a  partly social scientific account of the
epistemic access we can have to such norms, and it will  answer the question of justification by
describing how persons can justify demands for social change on the basis of their participation
in social practices. The vagueness of this description already shows that, in contrast to the
hermeneutic models, practice-based forms of social  critique must  differ considerably in their
respective interpretation of their ontological, epistemic and justificatory commitments. Thus, any
specific model of practice-based  critical theory must be judged on the  merits of  its particular
responses to these problems.
2. Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique
Before Habermas’ theory can be examined as an example of  immanent critique, it must first be
shown that this is not a misnomer, especially in the light of  Habermas’ explicit rejection of  this
description.
From its very beginning, Habermas’ development of a theory of communicative rationality was a
response to the exhaustion of the theoretical force of several classic models of  justifying social
critique. Already in the eyes of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, the Marxist model,
which is  based on the interests and experiences of the working class, appears outdated, both
empirically  and theoretically. However, only  two decades  after  World War  II,  the competing
model of Adorno and Horkheimer is also  unable to provide answers to new theoretical and
political developments.8 
In his early attempts to reconsider the prospects of  a philosophically guided critique of  society,
Habermas begins to address this seeming impasse by developing an account of an emancipatory
social  science that  is  both  normatively  useful  and more  than just  a  reconstruction  of  some
particular normative standpoint. Such an ambitious form of critical theory not only requires a
methodology that avoids scientific positivism – for which all talk of normative potentials within
social reality is inadmissible from the start – but must also, as Habermas clearly recognizes, avoid
a narrowly hermeneutic conception of social science.9 
Habermas’ systematic objections against hermeneutics as a general foundation for a philosophy
of social science are well known.10 However, one can only fully understand why he holds that an
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emancipatory social science cannot be built on a hermeneutic model if one also considers
another, more empirical assumption of  his, which remains largely implicit in his methodological
writings; namely, the belief  that a hermeneutic form of immanent critique is historically
inadequate to the reality of contemporary societies. In particular, Habermas assumes that even if
there was a satisfying model of hermeneutic critique, the “raw materials” of such a critique which
earlier generations could still rely on – namely, constellations of accepted social norms which
allow for a progressive interpretation – no longer exist:
In the meantime, bourgeois consciousness has become cynical; as the social sciences
–  especially legal positivism, neoclassical economics, and recent political theory –
show, it has been thoroughly emptied of binding normative contents. However, if (as
becomes even more apparent in times of recession) the bourgeois ideals have gone
into retirement, there are no norms and values to which an immanent critique might
appeal with the expectation of agreement.11
This argument, however, only applies to those forms of immanent critique that appeal to norms
contained in the “consciousness” and “ideals” of a given society, that is, to forms of hermeneutic
immanent critique as described above. Nevertheless, Habermas takes it to ultimately delegitimize
the project of immanent critique altogether.  If  we recognize this one-sided understanding of
“immanent critique” it follows that, despite Habermas’ explicit claims otherwise, there might still
be a model of practice-based immanent critique contained in his later work.
Since Habermas also rejects those practice-theoretical approaches that follow the young Marx in
locating normative potentials within the practice of productive labor,12 his argument above does
not reveal a return to Marxism, but rather the need for a new foundation of critical theory. While,
as Axel Honneth has shown,13 Habermas  temporarily  entertains  the idea of a reciprocal
correction between objectivist and hermeneutic forms of social science, he ultimately chooses
another strategy to examine the normative foundations of critical theory, by drawing instead on
the practice of communication.
Habermas’ first genuine attempt to formulate this new type of practice-based critique of society
is his inaugural lecture on “Knowledge and Human Interests”.14 His gradual elaboration of this
new approach over the next decade culminates in the Theory of Communicative Action. Only in
this text does he fully spell out the core commitment of his new model of  critique, namely, that
practices of communication contain the normative  potentials of social rationality that both
Marxism and the first generation of the Frankfurt School were unable to fully  acknowledge.
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While he does  not  describe  this  project  as  “immanent critique,”  he does describe  it  as “the
beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its own critical standards,”15 which draws on a
“potential for critique built into communicative action itself”.16 It is hard to imagine a better way
of saying that one is engaged in formulating a model of immanent critique.17 Therefore, it is not
surprising that his project has been understood by many of his interpreters as doing exactly this.18
3. Normative Epistemology, Social Ontology and Critique in the Theory of 
Communicative Action
If we understand the project of the Theory of Communicative Action as the development of  a
model of immanent critique then  it clearly belongs into the camp of practice-based critique:
“Communicative action” is Habermas’ term for a  type of social coordination made possible by
the binding force of validity claims which contains – at least in modern societies – normative
presuppositions with a context-transcending force19 on which a critique of society can draw.20
In developing this conception, Habermas not only subscribes to the claim that there are some
normative potentials within communicative forms of social interaction, but also to the stronger
claim that the relevant social practices are (at least partially) an embodiment of rationality. This
stronger claim is justified by the following argument: We can understand the general concept of
rationality only by reference to the concept of a valid reason which, in turn, has its primary place
within practices of communication and argumentation, which is to say, in practices of exchange
of speech acts. While speech acts can be used strategically, even their strategic use depends on
“illocutionary force”  which stems from a  non-strategic “original mode of language use”.21 This
“original” mode is characterized by an orientation towards mutual understanding and agreement
in regard to the validity claims raised. However, in order to be able to understand their  speech
acts as raising such  validity claims, the participants must  ascribe to each other not only this
orientation towards mutual understanding,  but also – at least in the more demanding forms of
postconventional discourse –  the acceptance of certain  norms of discourse which prohibit the
arbitrary exclusion of arguments or speakers, and which obligate speakers to formulate their
practical demands in view of the generalizable interests of everybody.22 Hence,  the practice of
communicative action contains within itself a potential for rationality that Habermas terms
“communicative rationality.”23 Habermas’ conception of communicative rationality serves at once
to supplement the one-sided focus of Weberian rationalization theories on increases in
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instrumental rationality24 and to designate the immanent potential in social practices on which a
critical theory of society is to rely.25 
With this account of  Habermas’ theory in place, it is possible to distinguish his response to the
three questions of normative epistemology (I), social ontology (II) and critique (III) raised above.
(I) Normative Epistemology: Habermas  calls  his  method  of  reconstructing  the  normative
presuppositions of understanding  in  the  Theory  of  Communicative  Action “formal”  or
“universal pragmatics”:26 Formal pragmatics is a type of  reconstructive theory that unearths the
idealized presuppositions of communicative  language  use.  Because  of  its  idealizations,  this
method is not a purely empirical reconstruction of language use. Nor is it a purely transcendental
method however, because it  is still  subject to empirical tests. In any case,  it turns out that  the
preconditions Habermas ascribes to  communicative action –  and thus its potentials –  are not
fully understandable drawing only upon formal theories of language.27 Rather, the very possibility
of reflexive consideration of validity claims presupposes shared contexts of meaning, background
knowledge and established normative practices, which  is  to  say, a shared and  symbolically
structured “lifeworld”28 that  cannot  be  fully  characterized  from a  merely  formal  perspective.
Therefore,  formal pragmatics are,  on  Habermas’  account,  not  a foundationalist method of
deriving norms, but must be complemented by a social theory of the lifeworld.
(II) Social Ontology: While  Habermas  is  not  explicitly  concerned with  social  ontology  – as
spelled out,  for  example,  by  accounts  like those  of  John Searle,  Margaret  Gilbert  or  Raimo
Tuomela29 – many of  his theoretical commitments are relevant in this context:30 The core claim
of  Habermas’  account  of  communicative  action  is  that  practices  of  communication  have  a
rational potential built in.31 If  we take ourselves to be engaged in such a communicative practice,
then we are, qua participation, committed to certain rules and standards. Prima facie, this looks
like a classic constructivist account: If  communication is an essential, non-optional practice, and
if – from the perspective of a participant in this practice – we cannot deny that we are bound to
certain norms without performative contradiction, then these norms have binding force. If  we
interpreted  Habermas  in  this  constructivist  sense,  his  account  would  no  longer  be  one  of
immanent critique, because the force and the validity of the relevant norms would be guaranteed
as a matter of the pragmatic structure of communication. As Habermas’ engagement with social
theory shows however, he rejects this constructivist option, since the normative potentials he
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finds in communicative action are neither historically invariant nor transcendentally given. Rather,
the transition from pre-modern to modern societies not only involves a differentiation of validity
claims but also a change in the  foundation of  normative validity. Specifically, in pre-modern
societies the normative force of  validity claims rests on the presupposed  symbolic consensus
established by tradition and religious authority. By contrast, the background conditions which
make communicative agreement possible in modern societies can only be understood within a
communicatively  structured  social  lifeworld,  which  is  a constellation of the  three structural
components of  cultural background knowledge, legitimate social norms and personal identities.
This  social  lifeworld  is  not  traditionally  enforced,  but  rather  reproduces  itself  through
communicative processes that do not presuppose the validity of  traditional norms.32 In this way,
the lifeworld is – in modern societies – both a structural precondition of communicative action
and the result of social integration through communication.33 
Habermas’ concept of the lifeworld introduces a component which cannot be described without
empirical and historical vocabularies, and so suggests a picture of  normativity that is  at least
partially one of  social immanence.34 Even though Habermas does not spell out an explicit social
ontological account of how exactly the relevant norms are instituted, his strong emphasis on the
lifeworld hints at the following understanding. On the one hand, the practice of  communicative
action, formally characterized, firstly explains the  normative force  of  communication, because
the very activity of raising validity claims requires binding oneself to certain normative standards.
Secondly, the practice of communicative action attributes a minimal, formally defined normative
content to communication in the form of the idealized presuppositions of communication.35 On
the other hand, the lifeworld designates a set of  constitutive preconditions for the possibility of
communicative  action,  which  provide  for  motivational  resources  and  enable  communicative
demands  to  result  in  specific  commitments.  Hence,  in  Habermas’ work  the  concept  of  the
lifeworld marks the  point  at  which critical  norms are immanently  grounded in social  reality;
although of  course, Habermas does not envisage just any kind of  norm being grounded in the
lifeworld, but rather the context-transcending, universal norms that the non-optional implications
of communicative action support.
(III) Critique: Finally, a  model of immanent critique  must show  that the immanent norms of
communication are actually suited for social criticism. This part of the Theory of Communicative
Action is, for reasons that are easy enough to understand, the most contested.36 Habermas does
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not  provide  a  systematic  justification  for  a critique of society that directly draws  upon  the
normative potentials that are institutionalized within communicative practices. He does not, for
example, focus  on  a critique of practices in which arguments or speakers are systematically
excluded.37 Rather, with his theory of colonization, he provides a higher-order account of social
pathologies.  The  “colonization thesis” rests upon an  analytical distinction between
communicative and strategic modes of action coordination, or in other words, between social
reproduction from the lifeworld and system perspectives. The lifeworld constitutes a perspective
on the symbolic reproduction of background knowledge, personality structures and normative
agreement, while  the “system” designates  structures of functional coordination of action and
material social reproduction that do not depend on communicatively generated understanding.
While Habermas still describes the “uncoupling” of system and lifeworld, which results from the
historical process of differentiation between fully communicative and functional forms of action
coordination,38 in  neutral  terms, his theory becomes critical as soon as he analyzes the
colonization  of  the  lifeworld;  that  is,  the suppression or undermining of communicative
coordination by the invasion of systemic mechanisms into practices which constitutively depend
on communication.39 Processes of colonization  –  in  which  systemic rationality oversteps  its
proper bounds – not only cause a loss of legitimacy, a fragmentation of everyday consciousness, a
loss of freedom and meaning40 and cultural impoverishment,41 they also endanger the integrative
function of the lifeworld by attacking the very  “infrastructure”  upon  which the  processes
themselves rely.42 The suppression of communicative rationality through colonization by system
imperatives is supposed to  explain not only pathologies – i.e. tendencies of a self-undermining
rationalization process – but also the normative source of social protests against rationalization.43
While  Critical Theory is not directly guiding such protests, it can at least articulate the contrast
between communicative ideals and the processes against which these social protests are directed.
On this last  issue  however, Habermas theory is  surprisingly cautious:44 Even though he
announces the Theory of Communicative Action as an analysis of the normative basis of critical
theory, he does not actually spell out directly which norms can justify a critique of society,45 but
rather describes  only  the learning potentials and functional accomplishments of a mode of
practice that  is blocked by the processes of one-sided rationalization. Despite this reservation,
Habermas’  combination of the method of pragmatics, his social theory of communicative
rationalization and the thesis of  the self-undermining character of  rationalization nonetheless
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reflects the intention of  the  Theory of  Communicative Action to develop the elements of  a
practice-based immanent critique.
4. Ambiguities in Habermas’ Implicit Social Ontology
Having sketched the shape of  Habermas’ project, it might not seem that his social ontology of
immanent normativity needs further elaboration. However, if  one examines his account of  the
lifeworld more precisely, there are several ambiguities which suggest that a more substantial social
ontological account is required. In this section, I attempt to show that Habermas’ distinction
between a formal pragmatic and a sociological conception of the lifeworld leads him to wrongly
assume that  there  is  no  problem of  social  ontology  to be  solved  (I).  For  the  same reason,
Habermas does not distinguish questions about the normative function of lifeworld norms from
questions  about  their  constitution  (II).  This  leads  to  an  implausible  form  of  the  distinction
between lifeworld and system (III), and in turn, as I will show in section 5, to several problems in
his model of social critique.
(I)  The  formal  pragmatic  and  the  sociological  conception  of  the  lifeworld:  Habermas
understands both the normative force of specific validity claims, and the normative force of the
more general idealizations presupposed in genuine attempts to reach understanding as supported
by context-transcending structural norms of communication, and as dependent on the normative
resources of the lifeworld. This dependence of the normative force  of the form of
communication on the concrete resources of a historically given lifeworld seems  to undermine
the claim of an autonomous normative potential of communicative action.46 It also prompts a
question as to whether Habermas’ conception of  a  purely communicative lifeworld – in which
this  normative potential  is  supposed to be concentrated – does not  amount to a  misleading
exclusion  of  the  phenomena  of  power  and  domination  which  can  be  empirically  found  in
existing structures of symbolic integration.47
In  response  to  this  criticism,  Habermas has  emphasized  the  distinction  between  a formal
pragmatic and a sociological conception of the lifeworld:48 The formal pragmatic conception of
the lifeworld explains how,  from the first-person perspective of participants, a background of
lifeworld  resources  may  always  be  presupposed  as  unproblematic from  within  contexts  of
communicative  action.49 By  contrast  to  this  internal  perspective,  the  sociological  conception
describes the reproduction of the necessary resources from the third-person perspective of the
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sociologist who can acknowledge the force of  non-communicative processes in the empirically
existing lifeworld. Having made this distinction, Habermas assumes that one can understand the
binding force of  communicative normativity (which is only accessible from the perspective of  a
potential  interlocutor,  that  is,  from  the  formal  pragmatic  perspective)  as  conceptually
independent from the sociological perspective on social norms. This means that, by presenting a
theory  of  social  evolution  that  explains  the  evolution  of  lifeworlds  from a  traditional  to  a
communicative logic, he sees himself  as capable of  fully explaining the force of  communicative
norms  from within this communicative logic  using the resources of  his formal pragmatics of
communication, without needing an additional account of their social ontology.
However, the distinction between the formal pragmatic and the sociological conception of  the
lifeworld on which this  argument rests is  ultimately problematic even within Habermas’ own
theory, because it creates the following dilemma: On the one hand, Habermas cannot rely on the
perspective of  participants  in communicative action alone to  explain  the contribution of  the
lifeworld  to  communicative  agreement,  since  from  this  perspective,  lifeworld  norms  cannot
become  thematic  at  all. Consequently,  Habermas  can  not  use  the  communication  theoretic
conception  of  the  lifeworld  to  explain  the  contribution  of  the  lifeworld  resources  to
communicative understanding. For this purpose, he rather introduces the “everyday concept of
the lifeworld,”50 which denotes the lifeworld from the perspective not of  participants, but of
“narrators”.51 It is unclear, however, how far this third standpoint really constitutes a self-standing
perspective.52 If, as Habermas suggests, the narrative perspective – in which the lifeworld can, in
contrast to the participant perspective, become thematic – indeed enables “statements about the
reproduction  or  self-maintenance”53 of  the  lifeworld,  it  is  not  obvious  how  exactly  this
perspective can be conceptually distinguished from the sociological one; nor is it clear that such
statements must necessarily presuppose an  unproblematic character of  the lifeworld norms. If
we  were  indeed  able  to  adopt  a  self-standing  formal  pragmatic  perspective  in  which  the
normative foundations of the lifeworld nevertheless could become thematic, the question would
necessarily  arise  whether  such  a  perspective  also  allows  us  to  criticize  these  norms  as,  for
example,  effects  of  power.  An  answer  to  this  question  that  remained  committed  to  the
unproblematic character of these norms would raise numerous objections as to whether a theory
of  communicative action could use this idealizing perspective to reconstruct binding normative
presuppositions, or whether it would not rather deserve the same criticism which Habermas had
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originally reserved for the hermeneutic theories.
On the other hand, if Habermas allowed for sociological insights into the empirically given social
practices and institutions of  the lifeworld to genuinely contribute to the understanding  of  the
normative force of  communicative action, it would no longer be obvious that we can indeed
understand the force of  all aspects of  communicative normativity from the perspective of  its
internal logic.54 Most importantly, the issue would remain unsolved whether we are allowed to
neglect the question whether the institutional foundations of  communicative normativity also
include  non-communicative  social  relations.55 This  question,  which  will  be  discussed  more
extensively in the following section, cannot be answered without a more substantial account of
the social ontology of the lifeworld.
(II) The conflation between normative function and social ontology: Since Habermas considers
the  combination  of  a  theory  of  social  evolution  and  formal  pragmatics  to  be  sufficient  to
understand the normative constitution of the lifeworld, he commits himself  to an implicit social
ontology that amounts to a radical form of  social ontological monism. More specifically, since
Habermas assumes that, from within the formal pragmatic perspective, we must understand all
traditional forms of symbolic consensus to have been replaced by communicative agreement56 in
modernity, and because he endorses the thesis that communicative action is – again, from within
this  perspective  –  sufficient to understand the reproduction of modern  lifeworlds,57 he  is
committed to the thesis that we can answer all constitutive questions within the social ontology
of  immanent  norms  with  a  theory  of  communication.  Moreover,  because  he  identifies  the
normatively  relevant  accomplishments  of  the  lifeworld  –  from its  internal  perspective  –  as
consisting in its capacity for communicative rationality, and because he analyzes the binding force
of  the relevant norms as operating only through communicative validity claims, he restricts the
analysis of the mode of institution of lifeworld norms to those processes which can be described
within a model of  communicative reproduction.58 Habermas thus effectively argues from the
premise that we – as participants – can only understand those norms to have binding force which
we can also understand as being, in principle, justifiable in discourse, and he takes this premise to
imply the truth of  a social ontological thesis about the mode of institution of critical norms. The
validity of  this implication depends, however, on the assumption that we can derive insights in
social theory from a lifeworld standpoint and effectively entails a “conceptualization of  society
from philosophical premisses”.59 But this assumption restricts the social ontology of  immanent
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normativity  considerably:  While  Habermas  criticizes  the  hermeneutic  fiction60 that  social
integration  is  only  accomplished  through undistorted  communication,  and although  he  even
occasionally stresses that phenomena of  power and strategic action are empirically  relevant for
the reproduction of the resources of the lifeworld,61 he ultimately considers these phenomena to
be irrelevant for the specific task of understanding the lifeworld's capacity to institute the kind of
social normativity that provides the foundation for his critical project.62
This narrow focus on a purely communicative model of the institution of normative demands
excludes, from the outset, the question of  whether there could also be normative potentials that
we can understand as having binding force that are instituted by other forms of practices. That is,
Habermas  assumes  that  there  are  no  relevant  communicatively  redeemable,  but
non-communicatively  instituted  normative  potentials  implicit,  for  example,  in  structures of
non-communicative  intersubjective authority  relations,63 affectivity or cooperation. If  such
sources of  normative force were acknowledged, then a critical theory would be possible that
would not need to understand the entire normative force of  critique as in principle explicable
within a communicative standpoint. This critical theory would then be able to recognize critical
potentials even within practices that do not accord a privileged role to communicative action. 64
But as long as competing accounts of  social ontology – that is, of  the mode of  institution of
norms – that rely on such structures are not even considered, critical theory is condemned to get
only as much potential for rationality out of the lifeworld as it has conceptually invested into it,
since it restricts itself to those forms of the reproduction of normativity that are singled out for
normative reasons.
(III)  The  problematic  distinction  between  lifeworld  and  system:  The exclusion of
non-communicative elements of the lifeworld from Habermas’  social ontology is closely
connected to his  contrast between lifeworld and “system”. While  the  analytical  distinction
between  these  two  modes  of  integration  has considerable advantages for his  theory of
rationalization, it is dangerous insofar  as it leads  Habermas ultimately to accept a  functionalist
analysis of  social integration as described from the third-person perspective.65 Even though, in
Habermas’ view, all forms of systemic integration  presuppose the irreducible existence of a
communicatively integrated lifeworld because “they have to be institutionalized”,66 his narrow
conception of the social ontology of lifeworld normativity leads him to rigidly separate processes
of communicative integration from processes of systemic integration. Although the conditions of
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systemic integration  are instituted by communicative agreement, they  do not draw upon such
agreement.67 Hence,  they  must be described as free from any relevant internal normative
conflicts.68 Thus, for conceptual reasons, normatively relevant social conflicts can only be caused
by the  tendency of  the spheres of  systemic social integration  to violate the norms of clearly
distinguishable social practices in the communicatively structured lifeworld.69
This feature of Habermas’ analysis excludes any theoretical attempt to understand the normative
institutionalization of systemic coordination mechanisms in a way that allows for the question
whether there are normative attitudes or expectations built into non-communicative  practices
which these mechanisms can frustrate or fulfill.70 However, as long as Habermas cannot ask this
question, his general critique of  functionalism has only limited consequences for his normative
project.  It  remains  restricted  to  a  weak  formulation  which  only  states  that,  contrary  to  the
assumptions of  systems theory, the mode of  coordination within systemic spheres  as a whole
depends on the lifeworld. This is, however, insufficient for a convincing normative critique of
specific forms of  systemic action coordination. An  immanent critique of  practices guided by
systemic  rationality  would  be  possible  only  if  Habermas  extended  his  argument  against
functionalism  to  include  the  claim  that  systemic  action  coordination  within  specific  social
practices draws in its concrete modes of operation71 on immanent normative resources from the
very same social practices.72
If Habermas were to strengthen his anti-functionalist thesis in this way he might conceive of
systemic coordination not as a self-regulating sphere of non-normative mechanisms, but rather,
as I will suggest in more detail in the next section, as a distinct type of  second-order normative
self-regulation  of social  practices.  This  perspective  would  provide  him  with  resources  for  a
normative critique of  colonization.  However, it  would also require Habermas to give up the
social ontological monism of communicative action, because he would need to ascribe normative
potentials to non-communicatively instituted practices.
5. Ambiguities of the Model of Critique
Having argued that Habermas does not develop the social ontology of communicative action in a
satisfying way, I  now  want  to  argue  that  the ambiguities of Habermas’ social ontology of
normativity, and  especially those  concerning the  degree of independence of communicatively
generated normative force from power and domination, have substantive normative implications
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for his mode of social critique. 
We can examine the extent to which immanent norms of communication can provide a standard
for social critique at  three levels:73 First, a  social  critique  might attempt to criticize specific
normative arrangements by recurring to the immanent norms of discursive practices. This
obviously is not what Habermas has in mind: The norms of discourse that can be reconstructed
by  universal pragmatics do not directly  determine  what people must  agree on in concrete
discourses. Rather,  these  norms  only specify what will count as acceptable discourse. While
Habermas has previously  attempted to formulate a more substantial account of social  critique
using a model of universalizable interests,74 and while this model remains central for his discourse
ethics,75 he more or less gives up on the attempt to derive significant conclusions for a large-scale
critical social theory from this line of thought.76
Habermas describes the critique on the  second level as a critique  of  “systematically distorted
communication”. This expression describes instances of supposedly communicative action where
agents are forced to systematically, but covertly and unconsciously, violate communicative norms
due to some constraint. This concept, which Habermas developed in the 1970s,77 is still present
in his  later work,  especially  as  the complement to the idealizations that  are reconstructed by
formal pragmatics.78 However, Habermas refrains from systematically exploiting this idea for his
critique of  society.79 On the rare  occasions  on which he mentions the  concept  of  distorted
communication in this context, he oscillates between rejecting it as a model for the understanding
of systemic imperatives – which, in his words, do not deceive but rather “openly come […] from
the outside”80 – and claiming that it is constitutive of social pathologies in general.81 
The third and final  level of superseded  communication is the level at which the colonization
thesis must  be discussed. At this level, Habermas distinguishes between legitimate forms  and
problematic forms of mediatization. While legitimate forms replace communicative coordination
by systemic coordination in ways that enable the production of material wealth to compensate for
losses of communicative coordination, problematic forms of colonization endanger the
life-world.82 Habermas uses the  latter expression to describe processes of  mediatization which
lead to fragmentation, delegitimization, cultural impoverishment and disintegration.83 Surprisingly,
however, all these descriptions – with the possible exception of the decline of the integration of
the different value spheres –  refer  to  social dysfunctionalities caused by colonization,84 and
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especially to the loss of  the capacity  of communicative processes to continue to perform their
functions of legitimation and of  integration of the self and the  community, rather  than  to
violations of normative expectations that inhere in the communicative process itself.85 It has been
widely objected that this functional criterion is neither able to provide a standard that allows to
distinguish (normatively) legitimate from illegitimate delinguistification (“Entsprachlichung”) nor
a standard which would be suited to criticize colonization from the perspective of communicative
rationality.86 In other words, it  is  argued that  this  form of  critique is  incapable of  justifying
particular demands for social change employing the norms immanent in communicative practices,
rather than relying on the implicit premise that dysfunctionalities of  symbolic integration are, as
such, normatively problematic.87
Since Habermas only allows for a narrowly conceived communicative foundation for immanent
normativity, he has no recourse to substantive immanent norms when he sets out to criticize the
effects  of  non-communicative  social  integration.  Although  this  weakness  has  widely  been
recognized, it can only be fully understood if  one contrasts Habermas’ restricted, monistic social
ontology with a richer account that locates the institution of norms within contested practices of
intersubjective authority ascription.  If  we were to allow that not only communicative, but also
non-communicative elements of  social practices can constitute a source of  normative force of
critical  demands,  we could  paint  a  picture  of  social  norms  according  to  which  colonization
processes violate the immanent norms of particular social practices.
We can only develop such an account however if  we shift the focus of  the debate away from
issues  concerned  with  the  correct  understanding  of  the  structures  of  discourse  and
argumentation, and away from elaborating normative ideals like autonomy or rationality, towards
the question of  what  social authority critique can claim.88 Hence, to develop a plausible social
ontology, we must rather focus on the different modes in which shared social norms can be
instituted, and on the internal potentials these modes offer for critique. This analysis must be
guided by the hope that clarifying the social authority of  critique will  furnish new criteria to
distinguish changes to structures of  social norms that are rational and inclusive from illegitimate
normative  transitions  that  rest  on  power  structures  which  only  pretend  to  have  a  claim  to
legitimate acceptance.89
Of  course,  such a  model  of  a  critical  social  ontology  needs  much more  elaboration  to  be
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plausible.90 However, if we could make sense of the idea that there are unrealized normative
potentials in social practices, we might be able to formulate  a richer account of the normative
basis of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate delinguistification. This is because, on
such an account, it  is possible to distinguish between various types of  practices that institute
different kinds of  second-order norms to regulate the entitlements of  the participants in regard
to their role in the administration of  first-order, social norms. In some  practices, the mode of
practical authority ascription implies that the participants are not normatively entitled to demand
justifications for certain interpretations of the rules of the practice. Other practices, in contrast,
involve forms of recognition which constitute  a  mutual ascription of entitlements to  a
communicative justification of  controversial normative evaluations. When practices of  the first
type are integrated into systems of media-based coordination, this does not necessarily produce
violations of normative expectations. However, practices of the second type must be described as
pathological in a normative sense whenever their participants are forced to submit to rules that
effectively undermine their normative status, because this amounts to a structural violation of the
entitlements that are constitutive of the practice in question. We could, for example, understand
the colonization of educational institutions by money or administrative power in this sense. That
is, one could claim that there are practices in educational institutions that constitutively depend
on a reciprocal recognition  that  the  participants  are entitled to justification  for  all  relevant
demands made upon them. As soon as such practices are constrained by rules which prevent this
recognition from becoming explicit as demands for justification, then participants are forced to
treat all conflicts within the practice as merely strategic, and are thereby prevented from realizing
the entitlements that are constitutive of their recognitive statuses within this practice.
To describe conflicts over  colonization in this way, however, entails a fundamental revision of
Habermas’ theory. To speak of a conflict  between suppressed  practice-immanent normative
expectations  on  the  one  hand, and second-order norms that prevent  them from  becoming
explicit on the other hand, necessarily presumes  that there are sources of  normativity  beyond
those elements of  the lifeworld which can – at least in principle – become explicitly thematic at
any time. On such an account, the normativity of  the lifeworld must originate in a structure of
practical cooperation and of mutual  recognition which practically institutes normative demands
independently  of  a  communicative  affirmation  of  these  norms  as  binding. This proposal
amounts, therefore, to the claim that the normative force of  communicative rationality depends,
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from a  social  ontological  perspective,  on  the  institution  of  practical  demands  which cannot
exhaustively be described in communication terms.91
Even  though  this  modification  risks  losing  some  of  the  power  of  Habermas’  theory  of
rationalization, and significantly complicates the issue as to whether the standards of critique are
universal, it  not only allows for a normative distinction between two types of practices, it also
enables the model of communicative critique to be expanded to describe  forms of pathologies
within  systemically coordinated action spheres  that Habermas is forced to remain silent about.
Specifically, we can conceive of de facto systemically organized practices where the relevant
non-communicative second-order norms are not instituted by the acceptance of all participants
involved, but by domination or ideology. We can, for example, conceptualize  practices of
collaboration in industrial or service work as social practices with inbuilt normative demands that
particular organizational arrangements be justified, which are not allowed to be communicatively
raised  within the practices themselves because the action of  raising such demands is excluded
from the range of  actions which count as a part of  these  practices. A  critique of  this type of
forced delinguistification must be based  on a normative criterion which distinguishes different
practices based  on  their internal normative organization. Only  then  it  becomes  possible  to
formulate a social critique of  such practices that justifies why they should not remain subsumed
under a functional logic, as opposed to only  explaining why such a subsumption cannot occur
without a loss of meaning.
6. Conclusion
Even though the methodological issue of  immanent critique is rarely labeled as such, it remains
crucial for contemporary  critical theory. As  an influential  exponent  of  immanent  criticism –
albeit  implicitly  –  Habermas’ paradigm shift in the Theory of Communicative Action has
provided both new resources and new problems. In  particular,  his account of the social
foundations of communicative action – even though normatively attractive – tends to obstruct
our view of the complex preconditions of institutional reality, and thus obscures the plurality of
normative arrangements that underlie these practices. Hence,  a convincing reformulation of
immanent critique will have to go beyond his model by explicitly addressing the social ontology
of  the  normative potentials of  social practices, for example, by drawing on  recent  attempts to
connect the current discussions in analytic philosophy with the theory of recognition.92 Such
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developments open up new opportunities  for a theory of immanent critique that is  empirically
and normatively convincing, and that is able to understand itself  as making explicit the political
conflict over the constitutive authority which our participation in social struggles presupposes.93
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